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Several adverse macro-economic trends beginning in the early 1970’s drastically reduced the relative competitiveness of various sec-
tors of the Japanese economy. Firms in Western (industrialized) countries that were faced with a similar loss of comparative advantage 
dealt with the problem by undertaking strategies of restructuring--primarily, retrenchment and downsizing strategies.  However, in sharp
contrast to the Western approach, the Japanese response to industrial decline, from a HRM standpoint, was a product of the political, cul-
tural, and social institutions/values of that society. The Japanese government, business sector and the labor unions worked together to
‘maintain’ employment levels (albeit, mainly that of permanent employees) in order to minimize the costs of adjustment for the key stake-
holder groups in particular, and for the Japanese society as a whole, in general. 
Keywords: Corporate Restructuring/Declining industries; HRM strategies; Japanese management 
1. Introduction
The spectacular rise of Japan as an economic power 
since World War II has few parallels in history (Patrick 
and Rosovsky, 1976; Vogel, 1979; Dore, 1986). That a
nation such as Japan, devastated by war and with practi-
cally no resources, has been able to achieve a dominant 
position in the global trading environment within such a 
short period of time has kindled the curiosity of many 
scholars and policy-makers worldwide. Various reasons 
such as favorable geo-political developments and policies, 
astute and growth-oriented government policies, busi-
ness-government cooperation, management policies and 
labor-management relationships, cultural traits, etc. have
been identified as reasons for Japan’s success (Yoshino, 
1968; Hadley, 1970; Magaziner and Hout, 1980; Ouchi,
1981, 1984; Johnson, 1982; Aoki, 1984; Komiya, Okuno, 
and Suzumura, 1988; Johnson, Tyson, and Zysman, 1989;
and Okimoto, 1989, Fruin, 1992; Yasutaka and Kobayashi,
2001; Sueyoshi, 2002). 
However, macro-economic trends beginning in the 
early 1970’s (such as the adoption of the flexible exchange
rate, the oil shocks, the rise of the yen, global economic
slowdown, competition from newly industrializing coun-
tries, etc.) marked the beginning of the end of the un-
precedented and unparalleled growth that Japan enjoyed in
the 1950’s and 1960’s. Specifically, these trends drasti-
cally reduced the relative competitiveness of various sec-
tors of the Japanese economy. While the cost structures of
basic industries which depended on high levels of energy 
consumption (such as petrochemicals, aluminum, steel, 
and cement), increased tremendously, the manufacturing 
sector was able to absorb the increases in energy prices
through energy efficiency enhancing and other 
cost-cutting measures. However, increases in energy effi-
ciency reduced the demand for basic industries’ materials 
which in turn suffered from increasingly intense import
competition and structural excess capacity (Saxonhouse, 
1979). 
To combat the problems facing these industries, the
Japanese government adopted a program of adjustment 
assistance in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. In sharp
contrast to the policies of Western industrialized countries
and companies in those countries, the Japanese govern-
ment and the business sector worked together to ‘main-
tain’ employment levels (albeit, mainly that of permanent 
employees) in order to minimize the costs of adjustment 
for the key stakeholder groups in particular, and for the 
Japanese society as a whole, in general (Rajan, 1994,
1995). 
While firms in Western and other industrialized na-
tions undertook strategies of retrenchment and downsizing 
(Hu, 2001; Hashim and Bakar, 2003), Japanese compa-
nies--whose policies of lifetime employment and seniority
based HRM systems were widely known and well re-
garded 1 (Ballon, 1969, 1992)--adopted strategies that 
were distinctively pro-employment. This paper examines 
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in detail the strategies (from a HRM perspective) that
Japanese firms in declining industries undertook in con-
junction with the Japanese government to ‘maintain’ em-
ployment levels. 
2. The Legal Framework of the Japanese Govern-
ment’s Policies 
Since most industrialized nations were affected by the 
slow-down of the global economy in the 1970’s, the Or-
ganization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Council of Ministers articulated in June 1978 the 
principles for guiding policy actions for “positive adjust-
ment”. Realizing that “free market” solutions could be 
cruel instruments for solving the problems of industrial
decline, the Council of Ministers suggested that such
“positive adjustment” policies were to be undertaken to 
improve factor mobility conditions--namely, industry ac-
cess to capital, profitability of private enterprises, and
functioning of labor markets (OECD, 1979).
States could pursue the three following goals through
the use of “positive adjustment” policies: (i) assist the 
emergence of new, growth industries; (ii) ensure that firms
remain competitive during periods of product or techno-
logical transitions; and (iii) ease the withdrawal of re-
sources, including labor, from declining industries (Keyser, 
1990). With regard to assistance to declining industries, 
the OECD mandated that government action be (i) tempo-
rary, (ii) transparent (observable by major trading part-
ners), (iii) linked to the rationalization of obsolete capacity,
and (iv) free of protectionist measures against imports
(OECD, 1982). 
While several ad hoc policies had been adopted in the
past that targeted certain sectors of the economy, it was 
within the above framework suggested by the OECD that 
the Japanese government formulated comprehensive laws 
specifically dealing with the problem of industrial decline. 
Such laws were less sector-specific and more func-
tion-oriented than their predecessors. 
The Law on Temporary Measures for Stabilization of
Specified Depressed Industries (Tokutei Fukyo Sangyo 
Antei Rinji Sochi Ho) was passed in 1978 wherein 14 in-
dustries were identified as structurally depressed. Three 
other related laws: Law on Temporary Measures for those 
Unemployed in Specified Depressed Industries, Law on 
Temporary Measures for those Unemployed in Specified
Regions, and Law on Temporary Measures for Small and 
Medium Enterprises, were also passed to specifically as-
sist employers and workers in specified depressed indus-
tries and regions. 
The lifetime employment policy is applicable only to full-time em-
ployees of large corporations, who are mostly male and who are gradu-
ates of prestigious universities. Though there is no formal written con-
tract guaranteeing such lifetime employment, the practice is common
knowledge and has been in vogue since World War II. On the other 
Plans for the restructuring of the 14 designated indus-
tries in the five year time frame of the above laws were 
thrown awry by the second oil shock and persistent de-
pressed worldwide demand conditions (Peck, Levin, and
Goto, 1987). Hence, in April 1983, the Japanese gov-
ernment passed the Law on Temporary Measures for the 
Structural Improvement of Specified Industries (Tokutei 
Fukyo Sangyo Kozo Kaizen Rinji Sochi Ho) wherein 22
industries (including 11 of the 14 industries designated 
under the first law) were identified as structurally de-
pressed industries. 
The three other related laws were also replaced by the 
Laws on Special Measures Concerning the Stabilization of
Employment in Specified Depressed Industries and Speci-
fied Depressed Regions, and the Law on Temporary
Measures for Dealing with Regions Related to Specified
Depressed Industries. Designation of industries and re-
gions was made more flexible under the second law to 
provide assistance to employers to (i) prevent worker
lay-offs, and (ii) retrain workers and reassign them in new 
jobs within or outside the `firm’ (Sekiguchi and Horiuchi, 
1988). 
Please see Appendix A for further details of the list of 
the industries and the restructuring plans covered by the
laws. 
Since a majority of the industries designated as de-
clining industries under the above laws were large-scale,
energy-intensive industries, it is not surprising to see that 
firms from the manufacturing sector constituted the largest
group of firms that adopted adjustment policies in 1975,
1987 and 1993 (Table 1). Though not as adversely af-
fected, sales and service firms did also resort to some sort
of adjustment measures or schemes to a lesser extent. 
Table 1. Companies Adopting Employment
 
Adjustment Measures: 1975, 1987 and 1993 

Industry Manufacturing Sales Service 
Year ’75   ’87  ‘93 ’75  ’87  ‘93 ’75   ’87  ‘93 
Adjustment 71 40 41 37 14 29 Na 15 22 
In Use 
No Particular 29 60 59 63 86 71 Na 85 78 
Adjustment 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 Na 100 100 
Furthermore, with the highest life expectancy on earth
(75.9 for males and 81.8 for females), low fertility, and 
hand, the treatment of female workers who are mostly hired on a tempo-
rary or part-time basis, and foreign workers by Japanese corporations 
generally fall short of international standards and conventions. How-
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low migration, the Japanese population is aging at a very
rapid pace and Japanese firms are beginning to face the
realities of a shrinking labor market. People aged 65 and 
above accounted for only 5 percent of the total population
in 1950 but increased to 12 percent by 1990, and are pro-
jected to reach 23 percent by 2025. 
According to the Ministry of Labor (1993), older 
workers aged 55 and above constituted 20 percent of the 
labor force in 1990 and are expected to increase to 27 per-
cent by the year 2010. Hence, the Japanese government
has repeatedly directed firms to raise the mandatory re-
tirement age to at least 60 years, if not to 65 years (usually 
55 at most establishments). According to the Ministry of
Labor (1993), about three-fourths of Japanese firms with
30 or more employees have raised the retirement age to 60,
and ninety percent of such establishments have indicated
that they will do so by 1997. 
Hence, Japanese firms (whose lifetime employment 
and seniority-based HRM policies are widely renowned)
are being increasingly pressured by the government and by
demographic trends to keep the older workers (i.e., those
above 55) gainfully employed. 
3. Corporate	 Restructuring and HRM Strategies in
Japan 
Corporate responses to industrial decline/structural 
excess capacity in the Western industrialized nations have
typically included measures such as plant closures, mas-
sive lay-offs, elimination of entire levels of management, 
and adoption of early retirement programs. The govern-
ments in such countries either actively encouraged or tol-
erated such measures by the business community without 
realizing that they exacerbated the financial strains and 
health of the welfare state. 
In contrast to the reductionary measures of the West-
ern societies, the Japanese approach to the same prob-
lem--characterized by its political, cultural, and social in-
stitutions/values--is remarkably aimed at ‘maintaining’
existing levels of employment (Odagiri and Hase, 1989).
In other words, Japanese companies adopted strategies of
incremental employment adjustments which were ade-
quate organizational cost cutting measures and yet, least
disruptive from a societal standpoint. Specifically, the
various measures employed by Japanese firms to deal with
structural excess capacity are as follows (Table 2): 
(i)   	drastic reduction of over-time work
(ii) 	 hiring freeze, especially of new graduates 
(iii) 	 worker retraining, reassignment, and dispatch-
ing (shukko)
(iv) allowance for ‘extended vacations’ 




’75  ’87  ‘93 
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 ’75  ’87  ‘93 
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54 26 31 
50 12 16 
23 20 17 
16 6  5 
Na  4  6  
20 3  2 
5 3 1 
16 8  20 
24 4  10 
6 6 9 
5 1 3 
Na  1  5  
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
Na  5  14  
Na  5  9  
Na  3  7  
Na  4  2  
Na   na  5  
Na  1  2  
Na  1  2  
Source: Ministry of Labor (1993)
(v)	 temporary factory shutdowns
Drastic reduction of overtime work: As seen from Ta-
ble 2, this measure was one of the most popular means of
adjustment adopted by Japanese firms. More than one-half 
of the manufacturing firms indicated that they had used
this measure in 1975 with that number dropping to 26% in 
1987 and 31% in 1993. Sales and service firms also
adopted this measure, albeit in lesser numbers than manu-
facturing firms. In a society where employees usually 
work 30 to 50 hours of overtime work a month, the reduc-
tion of overtime work represents an effective tool for 
managers to cut costs during periods of economic down-
turn. For example, the New York Times reported an in-
dependent labor group’s estimate that savings from over-
time reduction were as high as three trillion Yen a year 
(equivalent to 27 billion US dollars in 1993). However, 
while overtime reduction meant that employees could 
spend more time with their families, it also reduced their 
income substantially and hence, was not welcomed by all.
Hiring freeze, especially of new graduates: One-half 
of the manufacturing firms and 16% of sales organizations 
adopted this measure in 1975. However, the numbers of 
firms resorting to such measures reduced dramatically in 
1987 and then increased marginally in 1993 (Table 2). In 
general, a strategy of no new hiring is nothing more than a 
straightforward cost cutting strategy. However, in a coun-
try like Japan, such a strategy signifies that no one is hired 
from the pool of new entrants into the labor force for that 
entire year. In other words, an entire work force cohort
group is eliminated within the company. Since such cohort 
groups are considered as the basic building blocks of the
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well received by the present employees while at the same
time diminishing the company’s reputation as an ideal
employer among potential employees. 
Worker retraining, reassignment, and dispatching 
(shukko): Worker retraining and reassignment are not un-
usual for Japanese employees (even blue collar workers)
as Japanese companies are noted for their job rotation and 
“generalist” training schemes whereby workers move from
one job to another throughout their careers (Inohara, 1990).
However, in worker dispatching scheme (shukko), an em-
ployee is moved from one company to its subsidiaries (for
example, some workers from Mitsubishi Shipbuilding 
were sent to Mitsubishi Automobiles), and affiliates (for 
example, though not a member of the Mitsui group, Toy-
ota Automobiles absorbed some of Mitsui Shipbuilding’s 
workforce). About a quarter of manufacturing firms and
6% of sales firms used this strategy to deal with redundant 
workers in their firms in 1975. Service firms also started
to resort to such practices in 1987 and 1993 (Table 2). 
Traditionally, Japanese companies used to employ
shukko to dispatch management personnel who had
reached the retirement age to subsidiaries or affiliates to 
maintain a complex horizontal corporate network (Tables 
3 and 4). 
Table 3. Relationship of Firms Transferring 

Employees (Multiple Answers, %) 

Same indst. Different
Group indst. group 
Capital Investment 
No capital investment  29.6 24.2 
Receiving firm is larger 9.3 22.3 
Receiving firm is same size   4.8 12.1 
Receiving firm is smaller   57.4 44.9 
Business Relationship 
No business relationship   9.3   10.5 
Receiving firm is a supplier  59.3 19.5 
Receiving firm is a customer   16.7 19.5 
Receiving firm is a sales agent 29.6 46.9 
Source: Inohara, 1990 
Table 4. Reasons for Loan of Personnel 
 (Multiple Answers, %) 
Receiving  Company 
Related  Unrelated  
Smoothing personnel administration 9.3 6.3 
Improving age structure 7.4 2.0 
Employee  education  11.1  18.0  
Managerial and technical education 59.3  45.7 
Manpower redundancy 38.9 32.0 
Security of job for retirees 42.6 14.8 
Other reasons 14.8 17.2 
Source: Inohara, 1990 
As evident from Table 3, almost 60% of the transfers 
within the same industrial group (keiretsu) were to smaller
firms and /or also to suppliers. This lends some credence 
to the widespread belief that it is often the smaller or cap-
tive firms in an industrial group that bear the brunt of the
restructuring effects and costs.  When transfers took
place between different industrial groups, the majority of 
workers who were sent to other companies ended up in
smaller outfits and / or also to sales agents of their original 
employers. 
Regardless of whether the receiving company was re-
lated or unrelated to the transferring company, the number 
one reason cited for “loaning” (transfer) of employees was 
managerial and technical education (Table 4). Security
of job for retirees and manpower redundancy were also
commonly cited causes for inter-company transfers of em-
ployees. 
Moreover, in a practice known as amakudari (literally 
translated as “descending from heaven”), bureaucrats upon
reaching the mandatory retirement age used to take up 
positions in large and medium sized firms companies and 
thereby reinforce the close links between the government
and the business community. 
However, in the context of a declining industry, 
shukko was not very popular with the workers or their
families as it placed tremendous strains on them in terms
of retraining and relocation despite being a source of con-
tinued income.
Strategies such as dismissal of temporary and 
part-time workers, temporary shutdown of factories, salary
reduction among management personnel, and ‘voluntary’
retirement of older workers were resorted to by firms only 
as later options if the previously discussed cost cutting 
strategies did not mitigate the financial strains of the
company (Table 2).  This stands in stark contrast to 
management practices in American companies where 
workforce reduction in the form of lay-offs, early retire-
ment, and retrenchment are often the first steps taken 
when faced with unfavorable market or demand conditions 
(Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992, Hoskisson, Johnson and
Moesel, 1994; Anand and Singh, 1997; Zhao, 2001). 
Furthermore, the Japanese government instituted
various schemes under the related laws (passed in 1978
and 1983 – discussed in the previous section) whereby
funds were set aside to assist firms institute retraining and
reassignment schemes for their employees. Workers
from depressed industries and regions were also eligible
for and received government assistance in the form unem-
ployment payments, subsidies, etc. 
3. Discussion and Conclusions 
In terms of Japan's response to dealing with problems
of industrial decline, it was within the framework sug-
gested by the OECD that the Japanese government formu-
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problem of industrial decline after the two oil shocks. 
While recognizing the advantages of market mechanisms
in high-growth economies, the Japanese government 
(MITI or MOT) intervened in the restructuring of the 
structurally depressed industries because industry adjust-
ments during the low-growth economy could take long
periods of time, and because social frictions that are
caused by adjustments were not necessarily small. 
With regards to HRM strategies, the employment ad-
justment measures undertaken by Japanese firms in con-
junction with the Japanese government and the labor un-
ions reveal a complex picture of how Japan dealt with the
problem of industrial decline. In sharp contrast to West-
ern industrialized societies where companies adopted re-
structuring strategies that were predominantly driven by
retrenchment and downsizing objectives, the Japanese 
response was a product of the political, cultural, and social
institutions/values of that society--strategies that were 
aimed at ‘maintaining’ employment levels as well as 
minimizing the costs of adjustment to key stakeholder
groups in particular, and to the Japanese society as a whole, 
in general.
Such strategies not only kept employment levels high,
but also reinforced the traditionally strong ties between the 
labor force and the company.  Finally, the efforts of 
Japanese managers (and bureaucrats) to retain the older
workers was partly due to the rapid aging of the Japanese
population and consequently, a shrinking labor force.
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Appendix 
Plan for Disposal of Facilities in Structurally Depressed Industries, 1978-1988
 Targeted volume of disposal (000 tons)
Under the Depressed Industries Law Under the Structural Law 
Industry (1978-83) (1983-
Steel making by electric 2,850.0 (14%) 3,800.0 (14%)
Furnace 
Aluminum refining 530.0 (32%) 930.0  (57%)
Synthetic fibers and wool 
Nylon fiber 73.4 (20%) as in 1978-83 
Polyacrylonitrile wool 84.9 (17%) as in 1978-83 
Polyester fiber 44.9 (13%) as in 1978-83 
Polyester wool 78.4 (20%) as in 1978-83 
Biscoase wool 44.7 (15%)
Shipbuilding by use of 
A dock to build ships 
of over 5,000 GT 3,400.0 (35%)
Chemical fertilizers 
Ammonium 1,190.0 (26%) 660.0 (20%)
Urea 1,790.0 (45%) 830.0 (36%)
Phosphoric acid by wet 
process 
Phosphoric acid by dry 240.0 (32%)
process  810.0 (13%)
Synthetic fertilizer 
Spinning mills 
Cotton spinning 67.1 (56%) as in 1978-83 
Combed-wool spinning 18.3 (10%) as in 1978-83 
Ferrosilicon 10.2 (21%) 50.0 (14%) 
Paper 
Linerboard 1,150.0 (15%) as in 1978-83 
Western-style paper 950.0 (11%)
Petrochemicals  
Ethylene  2,290.0 (36%)
Polyolefine  900.0 (22%)
Oxidated vinyl resin 490.0 (24%)
Ethylene oxiside 201.0 (27%)
Oxidated vinyl pipe 116.0 (18%)
Sugar refining 1,000.0 (15%)
Sources: Japan, MITI, Kōzōfukyoho no kaisetsu (A commentary on the Depressed Industries Law) (Tokyo: Tsūshō Sangyō Chōsakai, 1978), pp.
280-99; and idem, Kankōhō no kaisetsu (A commentary or the Structural Reform Law) (Tokyo: Tsūshō Sangyō Chōsakai, 1983), p.82.
Note: Figures in parentheses are targeted volume of disposition as a percentage of total capacity.
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